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Oligarchs After The Maidan:  
The Old System In A ‘New’ Ukraine 
Wojciech Konończuk
There have been major changes in the balance of forces among the key Ukrainian oligarchs, rep-
resentatives of big business with strong political influence, since the victory of the Maidan revo-
lution. However, these changes have not undermined the oligarchic system per se. Over the past 
decade or so, the oligarchs have been key players in Ukrainian politics and economy, and they 
have retained this position until the present. One of the effects of the change of the government 
in Kyiv and the war in the Donbas was the elimination of the influence of ‘the family’ – the people 
from Viktor Yanukovych’s inner circle who formed the most expansive oligarchic group in Ukraine 
at the time of his presidency. The influence of Rinat Akhmetov, the country’s wealthiest man, has 
also weakened significantly; Akhmetov was one of the most influential people in Ukraine for more 
than ten years, partly owing to his close bonds with Yanukovych. Dmytro Firtash’s group has also 
lost a great deal of its influence since Firtash was arrested in Austria in March 2014. 
The elimination (‘the family’) or the reduction in influence (Akhmetov and Firtash) of what 
were until recently the most powerful oligarchic groups has been accompanied over the past 
few months by an unprecedented increase in the influence of Ihor Kolomoyskyi. The present 
governor of Dnipropetrovsk oblast has become Ukraine’s most powerful oligarch, and has am-
bitions to expand his influence. Other representatives of big business (including Victor Pinchuk, 
Serhiy Taruta and Oleh Bakhmatyuk) have also maintained their positions. Petro Poroshenko is 
a special case. He had been considered a second-rank oligarch over the past few years, but since 
being elected president he has become the most important person in the country, along with 
Prime Minister Yatsenyuk. However, Poroshenko has promised to sell his main business assets. 
Despite the reshuffle among the key oligarchic groups seen over the past few months, and the new 
government’s declarations that radical reforms are necessary, the oligarchs are unlikely to lose their 
influence on Ukrainian politics and economy in the foreseeable future. The conflict in the Donbas, 
the deep economic crisis in Ukraine and the instability of the government coalition all mean that 
the government is too weak and lacking in will to eliminate the oligarchs’ influence. Furthermore, 
the outcome of the parliamentary election confirms that representatives of big business have re-
tained significant influence in the Ukrainian parliament. The oligarchs’ control of the key economic 
sectors and the media, coupled with the proneness of government representatives to corruption, 
means that any possible attempt to upset the oligarchic system will generate serious tension. 
The hidden dimension of Ukrainian politics
The influence of oligarchic groups has been 
one of the dominant features of Ukrainian pol-
itics since the mid-1990s. Even though govern-
ments have changed several times, the oligarchs 
have been able to maintain their significance 
and influence by monopolising key economic 
sectors, with all the possible negative conse-
quences. These reached their apogee after the 
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‘Orange Revolution’ in 2004 as a result of the 
bitter rivalry between the president and the 
prime minister and the weakening of the state. 
As a consequence, competition between the ma-
jor oligarch groups1 has become one of the key 
mechanisms in Ukrainian politics. Each group 
has provided individual political parties with 
funds and support from the TV stations which 
they have owned. In exchange for this, their 
interests have been represented in parliament 
and other state institutions. One could say that 
a parallel dimension of Ukrainian politics has been 
formed, where oligarchs are key players, even 
though their game takes place behind the scenes. 
The oligarchic system has become a durable el-
ement of Ukrainian everyday political and eco-
nomic life. However, paradoxically, this rivalry 
between the few most powerful oligarchs has en-
sured pluralism in politics, and has for many years 
successfully blocked any authoritarian tendencies.
The balance in the system was upset to a cer-
tain degree after Viktor Yanukovych was elect-
ed president in March 2010. The group focused 
around him (‘the family’) led by his son, Olek-
sandr, soon started expanding its influence, 
taking over more and more assets and weak-
ening the other big business groups. However, 
the two strongest oligarchs, Rinat Akhmetov 
and Dmytro Firtash, were able to maintain 
a significant degree of influence2. As a result, 
1 See the comprehensive study concerning oligarchs in 
Ukraine: Sławomir Matuszak, ‘Oligarchic democracy. 
The influence of business groups on Ukrainian politics’, 
OSW Studies, September 2012; http://www.osw.waw.pl/
en/publikacje/osw-studies/2012-10-16/oligarchic-democra-
cy-influence-business-groups-ukrainian-politics
2 Akhmetov remained the most important sponsor and 
‘shareholder’ of the Party of Regions thanks to his . good 
relations with Yanukovych. Serhiy Lyovochkin was the 
main representative of the Firtash group in the govern-
ment. He served as the head of the Presidential Admin-
istration under Yanukovych (2010–January 2014). Both 
oligarchic groups took over more assets at that time.
a system was formed where three oligarchic 
groups held the strongest positions, and a few 
other oligarchs remained in the second tier3. 
The Maidan put an end to what had seemed 
the inevitable further growth of ‘the family’s‘ 
strength. 
The anti-governmental protests were backed 
more or less openly by some Ukrainian oli-
garchs, including Petro Poroshenko and Viktor 
Pinchuk, although they did not belong to the 
most influential groups. They viewed the con-
tinuing expansion of ‘the family’ and the in-
creasingly evident tendency towards undermin-
ing the previously existing pluralism as a threat4. 
Serious changes have been seen in the balance 
of forces between the oligarchic groups since 
Yanukovych fled the country and the conflict 
in eastern Ukraine broke out. 
The major oligarchic groups 
after the Maidan
One direct effect of the government change 
in February 2014 was the elimination of ‘the 
family’s’ influence. The greater part of the as-
sets and bank accounts which it controlled 
have been frozen, and the leading repre-
sentatives of this oligarchic group (including 
Oleksandr Yanukovych, the former prime 
minister Serhiy Arbuzov, the former minister 
for energy Eduard Stavitsky, and their close 
aide Serhiy Kurchenko) fled abroad. Investiga-
tions were launched against them on charg-
es of corruption, fraud and misappropriation 
3 According to Forbes, at the beginning of 2014, the following 
Ukrainian oligarchs owned a fortune worth more than US$1 
billion: Rinat Akhmetov (12.5 billion), Victor Pinchuk (3.2 billion), 
Ihor Kolomoyskyi (2.1 billion) and his business partner 
Henadiy Boholyubov (2.3 billion), Yuriy Kosyuk (1.5 billion), 
Vadim Novinsky (1.5 billion), Petro Poroshenko (1.3 billion), 
Kostyantyn Zhevago (1.2 billion), Serhiy Tihipko (1 billion). 
Forbes did not take into account Dmytro Firtash, whose for-
tune, according to Focus, was worth US$3.3 billion in 2013. 
4 The oligarchs felt even more insecure when Oleksandr Yaro-
slavsky, a powerful businessman from Kharkiv, was forced 
to sell part of his assets to Serhiy Kurchenko, a young busi-
nessman linked to ‘the family’. See: Wojciech Konończuk, 
Arkadiusz Sarna, ‘The presidential “family” in Ukraine is 
developing its business base’, 26 June 2013, http://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-06-26/presiden-
tial-family-ukraine-developing-its-business-base
The oligarchs are unlikely to lose their in-
fluence on Ukrainian politics and econo-
my in the predictable future.
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of state assets5. At the same time, ‘the fam-
ily’, led by Yanukovych and in co-operation 
with Russia, provoked the destabilisation of 
the situation in Donbas in March-April 2014 
by financing the separatists in the first phase 
of the conflict. However, the plan to use the 
region as a method to regain influence on 
Ukrainian politics did not work.
The political position of Rinat Akhmetov, who 
was one of the beneficiaries of the Party of Re-
gions’ rule, has been undermined significantly. 
It appears that the oligarch, who had vast in-
fluence in Donetsk oblast, was among those 
who inspired the destabilisation of the situa-
tion in eastern Ukraine. He thus attempted, like 
‘the family’ and most likely in collaboration with 
them, to use this as a bargaining chip in his con-
tacts with the new government. As the conflict 
escalated in the region and Russia increased its 
military engagement, Akhmetov was excluded 
from the main game6. As a consequence of the 
war in the Donbas, he has lost part of his as-
sets which remain in the territories controlled 
by the ‘separatists’ (some of them have been 
destroyed during the fights, others have with-
held or limited their operation). However, he 
has successfully diversified his business over the 
past few years, taking over assets in other parts 
of Ukraine, including in the power (DTEK)7, tel-
ecommunication (Ukrtelekom) and agricultural 
(HarvEast) sectors. The fact that Akhmetov is 
not in open conflict with the new government 
can be seen as proof that he has sealed a deal 
with Kyiv. Furthermore, the government has 
not called into question the results of the priva-
5 It is worth noting that initially the court accused Kurch-
enko of using a “criminal mechanism” at the time of pur-
chase in 2013 of UMH media holding (US$170 million) 
and FC Metalist Kharkiv (US$100 million). However, the 
shares of the two firms have not been frozen and are 
still owned by him. Kurchenko bought UMH from Borys 
Lozhkin, who has served as the head of Poroshenko’s 
Presidential Administration since June 2014.
6 However, the ‘separatists’ have so far left Akhmetov’s 
residence in Donetsk intact. This gives grounds for 
the assumption that he still has some influence in the 
self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic.
7 DTEK controls 76% of the heat energy production mar-
ket and 27% of total electricity production in Ukraine.
tisation of state assets since 2010, the key ben-
eficiaries of which were Akhmetov and Firtash.
The influence of Dmytro Firtash, the own-
er of Group DF, a holding operating mainly 
in the chemical, gas and banking sectors, has 
shrunk since the Maidan. He was among those 
oligarchs whose assets had increased under 
Yanukovych’s rule. Firtash is viewed as a busi-
nessman who has links with Russia because he 
has traded in Russian gas in co-operation with 
Gazprom for many years; this was the source of 
his capital8. Firtash was arrested in Vienna on 
12 March 2014 at the FBI’s request on charg-
es of bribery; this led directly to his loss of in-
fluence on Ukrainian politics. He paid bail of 
€125 million uros and was put under house ar-
rest. At present, he is waiting for the Austrian pros-
ecution authorities to decide whether he should 
be surrendered to US authorities. Serhiy Lyovoch-
kin represents his political interests in Ukraine. 
Despite his problems with the justice author-
ities, Firtash is still making attempts to influ-
ence Ukrainian politics. The Austrian press has 
reported9 that Firtash, Lyovochkin, Petro Po-
roshenko and Vitali Klitschko met in Vienna in 
late March 2014. Most likely, the main purpose 
of their meeting was to set the conditions on 
which Klitschko would withdraw from the pres-
idential race and leave room for Poroshenko10. 
8 Gazprombank was the main creditor of Group DF. Following 
the annexation of Crimea, Firtash remained the owner of 
Crimean Titan, one of Europe’s largest titanium producers; 
http://www.dsnews.ua/economics/firtash-otdal-krymskiy-
titan-moskovskoy-dochke--20102014080300
9 http://www.oe24.at/oesterreich/politik/daniel/Klitschko-Po-
roschenko-geheim-mit-Firtasch-in-Wien/138157731
10 Serhiy Leshchenko, ‘Poroshenko-Klitschko. Videnskiy alians 
pod patronatom Firtasha’, Ukrayinska Pravda, 2 April 2014.
Rinat Akhmetov was among those who in-
spired the destabilisation of the situation 
in the Donbas, attempting, like ‘the fami-
ly’, to use this as a bargaining chip in his 
contacts with the new government.
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Since the Klitschko’s party UDAR came into ex-
istence, the Ukrainian media have suggesting 
that it is linked to Firtash, who is believed to be 
its main sponsor. Several days after the meeting 
in Vienna, Klitschko officially announced that 
he would not run for the presidency and de-
clared his support for Poroshenko. This marked 
the beginning of the ongoing alliance between 
these two politicians. Poroshenko, who had no 
political base of his own, used the structures of 
UDAR in his presidential campaign. UDAR later 
joined the Petro Poroshenko Bloc. It can be as-
sumed that Firtash, who most likely ‘gave birth’ 
to this agreement, received security guarantees 
for his assets in exchange11.
The growing significance of Kolomoyskyi
The most important tendency seen in the 
Ukrainian oligarchic system over the past year 
has been the enormous increase in Ihor Kol-
omoyskyi’s influence. He has been one of the 
most powerful people in Ukraine since the 
1990s. His economic influence covers the fol-
lowing sectors: banking (PrivatBank, Ukraine’s 
largest bank12), oil (control of Ukrnafta, 
the most important fuel company), chemical 
(including DniproAzot), mass media (several 
TV stations, including the popular channel 1+1) 
and airlines (including MAU). Most of Kolo-
moyskyi’s assets form ?the the  Privat Group, 
a non-transparent holding which is controlled 
by Kolomoyskyi and his long-term business 
partner, Henadiy Boholyubov. Both oligarchs 
are known for taking over business assets ille-
gally and by force (‘corporate raiding’)13. 
11 Firtash manifested his self-confidence in his interview for New 
York Times in which he openly admitted: “Yes, I can influence 
politics. I am not a politician, but I have certain influences.” 
David M. Herszenhorn, ‘Brash Ukrainian mogul prepares to 
fight U.S. bribery charges’, New York Times, 6 May 2014. 
12 At the end of 2014, PrivatBank’s assets were worth 201 
billion hryvnias and were larger than the assets of the two 
next largest Ukrainian banks taken together; http://bank-
er.ua/officialrating/active/active/11/2014
13 For more information on corporate raiding in Ukraine, see 
Matthew A. Rojansky, ‘Corporate Raiding in Ukraine: causes, 
methods and consequences’, Demokratizatsiya, no. 3, 2014.
In the early period of Viktor Yanukovych’s rule, 
Kolomoyskyi came into conflict with Yanuk-
ovych’s inner circle, and the media began to 
speculate that he might thus be deprived of 
part of his assets14. However, the oligarch soon 
reached an agreement with the new govern-
ment; and this was accompanied – as can be 
assumed – by consent to grant unclear financial 
concessions. Until early 2014, Kolomoyskyi lived 
mainly outside Ukraine. Although he did not lose 
any of his assets, unlike other major oligarchic 
groups, he did not gain any new ones either. 
Immediately after the Maidan, when Russia 
launched its aggression in Crimea, and the 
situation in the east of the country became 
destabilised, Kolomoyskyi put forward his can-
didacy to become governor of Dnipropetrovsk 
oblast to the new government. Before this, 
the oligarch had shunned any public activi-
ty, and had never held any political functions. 
The acting president Oleksandr Turchynov nom-
inated him as the governor on 2 March 2014. 
What might seem at first glance to have been 
a surprising decision was a result of the con-
vergence of interests of Kyiv and Kolomoyskyi. 
The oligarch’s key assets were located in this 
critical region for Ukraine, which was then un-
der high risk of Russian-inspired destabilisa-
tion. He himself had spent most of his life in 
Dnipropetrovsk and was able to strongly influ-
ence the situation there. It did not take long for 
Kolomoyskyi and his group15 to calm the situ-
ation in the region and to successfully thwart 
14 Alexey Pedosenko, ‘Donetskiye pilyat biznes Kolomoysko-
go?’, Glavcom.ua, 15 September 2010.
15 Henadiy Korban, Boris Filatov and Svyatoslav Oliynyk, 
Kolomoyskyi’s trusted people who are in charge of his 
business, were appointed deputy governors. 
The most important tendency seen in the 
Ukrainian oligarchic system over the past 
year was the enormous increase in Ihor 
Kolomoyskyi’s influence.
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attempts to expand the destabilisation out of 
Donbas. The first volunteer battalions (Dnipro 
and Dnipro-1, each consisting of around 500 
people) were formed upon the Kolomoyskyi 
group’s initiative and are financed in part by 
the Privat Group. Kolomoyskyi also provided fi-
nancial support for several months to various 
newly-formed battalions (including the Azov, 
Aydar, Donbas and Right Sector battalions). 
Kolomoyskyi’s effective rule in Dnipropetrovsk 
oblast was especially evident when compared 
to the failure of Serhiy Taruta, an oligarch from 
the metallurgical sector who holds shares in 
the metallurgical holding ISD, and who had 
been nominated as governor of Donetsk oblast 
at the same time16. Even though Taruta comes 
from Donbas and his business assets are locat-
ed there, he has proved unable to contain the 
growing destabilisation in the region; he had 
initially downplayed the threat. 
Within a few months of taking office, Kolo-
moyskyi was able not only to stabilise the sit-
uation in Dnipropetrovsk oblast (winning the 
residents’ support) and protect his business, 
but also to expand his influence to other re-
gions. In early May 2014, as a consequence of 
Kolomoyskyi’s lobbying, Ihor Palytsia was ap-
pointed governor of Odessa oblast, a region 
of strategic significance for Ukraine. Palytsia is 
the chairman of the supervisory board of the 
Ukrnafta company, and has worked for Kolo-
moyskyi for many years. Kolomoyskyi also has 
a certain, albeit unclear, scope of influence in 
Kharkiv oblast owing to his good relations with 
the mayor of Kharkiv, Henadiy Kernes.
16 According to Ukrainian media reports, Kyiv initially offered 
this function to Rinat Akhmetov, but he rejected this offer. 
Kolomoyskyi’s political successes encouraged 
him to embark upon a programme of business 
expansion at the expense of other oligarchs. 
Last July, in his capacity as governor of Dnipro-
petrovsk oblast, he announced that the state 
should confiscate assets owned by supporters 
and sponsors of separatism, and also by those 
who gained their assets as a result of unfair 
privatisation17. On that occasion he mentioned 
companies which had been privatised after 2010 
by Akhmetov and Firtash. The two groups felt 
endangered by the growing significance of the 
oligarch from Dnipropetrovsk. Ivan Fursin, Fir-
tash’s trusted business partner, said in an inter-
view that “Kolomoyskyi feels that we have been 
weakened, and wants to destroy us, take away 
everything from us”18. However, Kolomoyskyi 
has still not managed to deprive the compet-
itive oligarchic groups of their assets, due to 
a lack of consent from Kyiv19. Nevertheless, he 
knows how to use the new political situation 
to develop his business: Ukrnafta is the main 
fuel supplier for the army, PrivatBank received 
significant loan support from the National Bank 
of Ukraine last year, and the companies con-
trolled by him have won tenders announced by 
the state. 
Oligarchs in the election process
When the 2004 constitution was reinstated in 
late February 2014, the role of the president 
was weakened, and the parliament’s preroga-
tives strengthened significantly. The change of 
the political system is beneficiary from the point 
of view of the oligarchs who since the 1990s 
had been influencing the key political parties, 
17 ‘Kolomoyskyi rozpoviv, schcho iz aktyviv Akhmetova i Firta-
sha slid natsionalizuvaty’, Ukrayinska Pravda, 14 July 2014. 
18 Tatiana Nikolayenko, ‘Oligarkhi na vyborakh: stavki Ly-
ovochkina, Firtasha i Boyko’, The Insider, 20 October 2014. 
19 His only successful move to this extent was the refusal to 
renew the long-term lease of two titanium factories to 
Group DF. These factories were leased to Kolomoyskyi’s 
companies; http://biz.liga.net/all/industriya/stati/2830037-
dobycha-firtasha-chto-zhdet-titanovyy-biznes-oligarkha-
bez-dvukh-gokov.htm 
Kolomoyskyi’s political successes encour-
aged him to embark upon business expan-
sion at the expense of other oligarchs.
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which have become an instrument for lobbying 
for their interests. Representatives of big busi-
ness have traditionally offered financial and 
media support to political parties in exchange 
for placing their people or themselves on party 
lists to gain immunity (for example, Akhmetov, 
Poroshenko and Pinchuk were members of par-
liament in the past). Despite the changes in the 
balance of forces between the Ukrainian oli-
garchs, ensuring a strong representation in the 
new parliament has become one of their key 
political goals.
An analysis of the election campaign, the infor-
mation policy of the TV stations controlled by 
the oligarchs, and the biographies of the new 
deputies leads to the conclusion that the major 
Ukrainian oligarchic groups have gained signifi-
cant influence in the Verkhovna Rada as a result 
of the parliamentary elections on 26 October 
2014. It is impossible to present this in detail, 
but the scope of their impact on individual po-
litical parties can be reconstructed. 
The Petro Poroshenko Bloc, which has formed 
the most numerous faction in the parliament 
(148 out of 422 parliamentary seats), is clearly 
influenced by two oligarchic groups: the group 
of Dmytro Firtash, who has links with UDAR, and 
the group of Ihor Kolomoyskyi, who was able to 
place his people on the list of candidates of this 
presidential bloc20. However, Kolomoyskyi clearly 
has the strongest influence on the People’s Front 
led by Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk (81 dep-
uties). Several businessmen and volunteer bat-
talion commanders linked to Kolomoyskyi were 
placed as candidates on this party’s lists21. While 
Kolomoyskyi’s TV station 1+1 actively support-
ed the election campaign of Yatsenyuk’s Front, 
Ukraine’s most popular channel Inter, which is 
20 For example, Oleksandr Dubinin, until recently direc-
tor of DniproAzot (Kolomoyskyi’s company); Oleksandr 
Shevchenko, director of the Carpathian holiday resort Buk-
ovel (owned by Privat); Vitali Kupyi, Kolomoyskyi’s advisor, 
Taras Batenko, former director of UkrTransNafta (a compa-
ny controlled by Kolomoyskyi); and Ihor Palytsia, the gov-
ernor of Odessa (he rejected a parliamentary seat).
21 Yuriy Bereza (Dnipro-1) and Andriy Teteruk (Mirotvorets). 
controlled by Firtash and Lyovochkin, backed 
above all the Poroshenko Bloc. 
Firtash’s group has also had visible influence on 
other parliamentary factions, including the Radical 
Party (22 seats) led by Oleh Lyashko (who has had 
links with Firtash for a long time) and to an extent 
in the Opposition Bloc (40 seats), a new grouping 
formed after the break-up of the Party of Regions. 
The Opposition Bloc project has a few major 
‘shareholders’; in addition to Firtash, these include 
Rinat Akhmetov and Viktor Medvedchuk, one of 
the key lobbyists for Russian interests in Ukraine22.
It is unclear precisely what share of the parlia-
ment is controlled by the oligarchs, especially 
as some of the deputies they supported won 
their seats in single-member constituencies (for 
example, Boris Filatov, the deputy governor of 
Dnipropetrovsk oblast, and Serhiy Taruta)23. 
Furthermore, there is a group of nineteen in-
dependent deputies who form a parliamentary 
group called People’s Will, which was estab-
lished by Ihor Yeremeyev, a second-league oli-
garch from the oil sector24. Another group of 
independent deputies, Economic Development 
(19 seats) formed by Vitalyi Khomutynnik, is 
in turn within the orbit of Kolomoyskyi’s influ-
ence. Apparently, Self-Reliance (32 seats) is the 
party least influenced by the oligarchs, even 
though it was clearly backed by the TV channel 
1+1 during the election campaign. 
22 ‘Soobrazili na troikh’, Hubs.com.ua, 3 October 2014.
23 According to Filatov, Kolomoyskyi controls fifteen deputies 
from the Poroshenko Bloc. ‘Filatov: zachem zvat inostrant-
sev v kabmin, yesli prokurory v dole?’, Liga.net, 3 December 
2014; Maksim Kamenev, ‘Igry oligarkhov posle vyborov’, 
The Insider, 10 December 2014.
24 Maksim Kamenev, op. cit.
The most recent parliamentary election 
has proven that Ukraine’s strongest oli-
garchic groups remain important political 
players.
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The de-oligarchisation of Ukraine?
The most recent parliamentary elections have 
proven that Ukraine’s strongest oligarchic 
groups remain important political players. Two 
of them, Kolomoyskyi’s group and that of Fir-
tash/Lyovochkin, have gained the strongest in-
fluence in the parliament. This means that they 
will be an essential element in politics through-
out the present parliamentary term. 
At present, nothing seems to indicate that the 
new government could bring about a de-olig-
archisation of the state. The extensive coalition 
agreement does not even mention the prob-
lem posed by the oligarchs’ excessive influence. 
It appears that no change in this context can be 
realistically expected in the foreseeable future, 
for several reasons. Firstly, the most powerful 
oligarchs have an extensive range of influence 
on the key political parties, whose leaders – as 
it seems – have certain (non-public) obligations 
with regard to them. There is still no answer to 
the question as to what extent the people who 
govern the post-Maidan Ukraine are willing to 
carry out systemic reforms; and this would be 
contrary to the oligarchs’ interests. Secondly, 
even if the required political will were present, 
the government is too weak to significantly curb 
the oligarchs’ influence, especially given the con-
tinuing war in the Donbas and – as everything 
seems to indicate – the worsening ongoing eco-
nomic crisis. Thirdly, the oligarchic groups are 
strong entities which control entire sectors of 
the economy and almost all the key TV stations; 
and this offers them a strong instrument to in-
fluence the public. Any attempt to strip them of 
part of their assets, even in the form of annul-
ling some dubious privatisations, would give rise 
to open conflict between Kyiv and the oligarchs. 
As a result, it appears that we cannot expect 
a disassembly of the oligarchic system. What can 
be expected, at the very most, is a further weak-
ening of some oligarchs’ positions and gradual 
steps aimed at ‘civilising’ the system. 
Measures promised by the government aimed 
at de-monopolising the economy will contribute 
to reducing the oligarchs’ influence. 
The government in Kyiv is interested in maintain-
ing a pluralism of oligarchic influences, which 
means a relative balance of forces between 
the strongest groups. The rise in significance 
of Ihor Kolomoyskyi’s group observed over the 
past few months is especially dangerous for 
the state in this context. The government took 
some visible measures in December 2014 and 
January 2015 against this oligarch, including an 
attempt to deprive him of control of Ukrnaf-
ta25 and the summons sent to Henadiy Korban, 
deputy governor of Dnipropetrovsk oblast, to 
appear at a public prosecutor’s office. How-
ever, this does not appear to be a beginning 
of an open conflict between President Poro-
shenko and Kolomoyskyi, but rather a desire to 
show that the rules of the game are set by Kyiv. 
As mentioned above, the government is too 
weak, and Kolomoyskyi is too strong for such 
a confrontation to be possible. It is also worth 
noting the oligarch’s growing influence in Dni-
propetrovsk oblast, which is becoming his ‘ap-
panage principality’. Public opinion polls carried 
out in December 2014 indicated that 34.2% of 
the residents of this oblast wanted Ukraine to 
be federalised (11% had supported this con-
cept eight months before), this being the high-
est rate among all regions26. Furthermore, the 
vote in parliament on a law that would deprive 
the Privat Group of control over Ukrnafta has 
made it clear that Kolomoyskyi has extensive 
influence inside Yatsenyuk’s party (only 13 out 
of 82 deputies from the People’s Front voted 
in favour of this act). 
25 Even though the state holds more than 50% of the shares 
in Ukrnafta, Privat (with a 42% stake) has controlled this 
profitable company for ten years, paying out either only 
small dividends or (as in 2011–2013) none at all. In January 
2015, the Verkhovna Rada changed the law reducing the 
number of votes required to convene a general meeting of 
shareholders from 60% to 50% plus one share. This might 
be a step towards Kyiv’s regaining control of Ukrnafta. 
The law will take effect in 2016. Furthermore, Ukrnafta has 
tax arrears worth 3 billion hryvnias (around US$200 million).
26 KMIS survey, opros2014.zn.ua. 
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The government has also made some moves 
aimed against the interests of Rinat Akhmetov. 
The Ministry for Energy has taken measures to 
weaken the position of his company, DTEK, ac-
cusing it of setting excessively high electricity 
prices. Until recently, DTEK was briskly heading 
towards the monopolisation of the Ukrainian 
power sector. Akhmetov himself was interro-
gated by prosecution authorities in connection 
with the suspicions of financing separatism in 
the Donbas. At present, nothing seems to indi-
cate that this could be a beginning of the end 
of Akhmetov’s business empire, but – of all 
the major oligarchic groups – he has the least 
political possibilities to lobby for his interests. 
The government has also taken visible meas-
ures towards Firtash’s companies (for example, 
the state-owned company Naftohaz insists that 
several chemical companies from Group DF be 
declared bankrupt due to their gas debts, and 
a group of influential politicians has appealed for 
a cancellation of Inter TV’s licence), which can be 
viewed as attempts to discipline this oligarchic 
group. This comes in addition to the intensifying 
dispute between Firtash and Akhmetov on the 
one hand, and on the other between these two 
oligarchs and Kolomoyskyi, who would like to 
strip them of part of their assets27.
The likely further decline in the influence of 
some ‘old’ oligarchs, especially those from 
the metallurgical and coal sectors (including 
Akhmetov, Novinsky and Taruta) will be ac-
companied by the growing significance of the 
27 Korban, Kolomoyskyi’s trusted man, has stated in an in-
terview that a new distribution of property is “100% sure” 
and that “some Ukrainian oligarchs may lose their assets”. 
Yulya Lavrysyuk, ‘Hennadiy Korban: u rossiyskikh kompaniy 
my dolzhny otobrat vse’, Obozrevatel, 29 August 2014. 
agrarian lobby, which generates 25% of Ukraini-
an exports. Certain oligarchs from the food and 
agricultural sector (including Oleh Bakhmatyuk, 
Andriy Verevskyi and Yuriy Kosyuk28) already 
have powerful political connections, and will 
try to use them to influence the passage of an 
act introducing free trade in arable land, which 
is expected to be presented during the present 
term of the Verkhovna Rada29.
Ukrainian oligarchs, capitalising on the state’s 
weakness and the government representatives’ 
proneness to corruption, have gained such ex-
tensive influence on the economy over the past 
few years that some of its key sectors have been 
monopolised, with all the accompanying negative 
consequences. Their financial strength has ena-
bled them to successfully lobby for their interests 
on the political level. The Maidan revolution has 
left the Ukrainian oligarchic system unshaken, 
and the parliamentary elections have shown that 
the most powerful oligarchs have gained seri-
ous opportunities to influence Ukrainian politics. 
It should be expected that the oligarchs will re-
main influential players in Ukraine for as long as 
they are able to use the weak state and well-de-
veloped corruption mechanisms to support their 
interests. The still strong oligarchic system will 
thus be one of the impediments in the process of 
reforming the Ukrainian state.
28 From July to December 2014, he served as deputy head 
of Poroshenko’s Presidential Administration. It is worth 
noting that companies owned by Petro Poroshenko con-
trol 96,000 ha of agricultural land.
29  For more information on the condition and future of 
the Ukrainian agriculture, see: Arkadiusz Sarna, ‘The 
transformation of agriculture in Ukraine: from collec-
tive farms to agroholdings’, OSW Commentary, 6 Feb-
ruary 2014; http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
osw-commentary/2014-02-07/transformation-agricul-
ture-ukraine-collective-farms-to
